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Abstract
Tax competition in the European Union is fierce. Especially since the en-
try of the new member States, tax reforms in the ”old” Europe are frequent.
In this paper we formally test the presence of strategic tax setting in the old
EU14 as a reaction to the tax rates in the new member states using a fiscal re-
action function. We first develop a simple model of spatial tax competition that
predicts an inverse relationship between distance and toughness of tax compe-
tition. Empirically we find indeed that tax competition is stronger for countries
relatively closer to the low tax region of the new members like Germany and
Austria than for old member States further away from the new member States
such as Spain, UK and Portugal.
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1 Introduction
Decreasing tax rates is especially an European issue. Corporate taxes dropped the
past 10 years by 12% in the EU versus 6% in non-EU OECD countries. Another
European trend is the compensation of declining tax rates with increasing taxable
income. As a result several studies conclude that tax competition in official tax
rates is present, but not in terms of effective tax rates (Devereux et al. (2002) and
Vandenbussche & Crabbe´ (2006)). This paper analyzes strategic tax setting in the
’old’ EU14 as a reaction to the tax rates in the new member states. Prior research has
shown that FDI is sensitive to tax rates (Mooij & Ederveen 2003). Also for Eastern
European countries the corporate tax rate is an effective instrument to attract FDI
(Disdier & Mayer (2004) and Bellak & Leibrecht (2005)). According to Devereux &
Griffith (1998) the effective average tax rate plays a role for US multinationals in
entering the European market, but they did not compare with official tax rates. In
contrast, Buettner & Ruf (2005) show that German multinationals take into account
the official tax rate, rather than the effective tax rate in their location decisions.
Therefore, this paper will focus on statutory tax rates, rather than effective tax
rates in the EU25.
Especially since the entry of the new member States, European tax competition is
fierce. Some earlier studies find that European countries set their corporate tax rates
interdependent (Devereux et al. (2003), Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002), Redoano
(2003) and Ruiz & Gerard (2007)), but none of these studies has investigated spatial
tax competition between the ’old’ EU14 and the new member states. This is where
the aim of this paper lies: we study to what extent geographical proximity to low
tax areas like the new member states, affects corporate tax rates in the former
EU14 countries1. We expect that tax competition will not be equally fierce between
all countries. Some countries will find decreasing corporate tax rates a priority,
1The EU14 includes Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, UK, France and Greece.
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while others focus on other economic issues. The question then raises whether the
geographical position of European countries vis- a`-vis the new member states (low
tax countries) influences the intensity of tax competition. Does the former EU14
anxiously look at tax reforms in the new, low tax, member states and adjust their
taxes accordingly?
For this purpose, we first develop a spatial tax competition model with countries
competing to attract a multinational. The model predicts that tax competition is
more intense between geographically close countries. Second, the outcome of the
theoretical model is tested using a fiscal reaction function.We test whether and
which EU14 countries respond to changes in the tax rates of the new EU member
states. The results indicate that distance to these new members matters for tax
competition i.e. EU14 countries closer to the EU10 like Germany and Austria are
more responsive than countries further away from the EU10 such as France, Belgium
and the Netherlands.
The paper is organized as follows. First, section 2 shows some stylized facts of
corporate taxes in Europe. Section 3 reviews the related literature on tax mimicking
and section 4 develops a theoretical framework. Section 5 explains the empirical
methodology and the data. Section 6 shows the results and 7 discusses the robustness
checks. Finally, section 8 briefly concludes our main results.
2 Corporate taxes in Europe: stylized facts
Falling corporate tax rates is especially an European issue. Figure 1 illustrates the
evolution of corporate tax rates in OECD2 and EU countries. We observe that
the tax rate in the OECD (-3%) remained more stable in comparison to the sharp
decrease in tax rates of the EU25 (-10%). Within Europe, both the older EU15
countries and the 10 new member states have known a decrease of 10% in their
2OECD6= Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and USA
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corporate tax rates. The figure also shows that during the whole period, corporate
tax rates in the EU15 are higher than in the new member states.
Figure 1: Evolution tax rates in OECD and EU, 1995-2006
Source: European Commission
Although traditional tax competition theories predict a downward pressure on cor-
porate taxes when capital mobility increases (for an overview see Wilson (1999) and
Bretschger & Hettich (2002)), empirical studies do not find evidence of a race to the
bottom in corporate taxes (Krogstrup (2004), Baldwin & Krugman (2004), Salva-
tore (2002), Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007), Desai (1999), Mendoza & Tesar (2004) and
Stewart & Webb (2006)). While statutory taxes fell down in the EU, tax bases were
broadened such that tax revenues on corporate incomes remained stable (Devereux
et al. (2002), Buijinck et al. (2002) and Vandenbussche & Crabbe´ (2006)). Figure 2
reports the evolution of the average effective tax rate of the EU15 countries and the
10 new member states (EU10). In contrast to the nominal tax rate, the aggregate
effective tax rate remained quite stable and even increased in the period 1993-2003.
Moreover, a study by Buettner & Ruf (2005) shows that German multinationals
4
Figure 2: Evolution effective tax rates in Europe
take into account the statutory tax rate, rather than the effective tax rate in their
location decisions. Therefore, we will measure taxes by the nominal tax rate instead
of the effective tax rate.
In contrast to prior studies, Figure 3 splits up the EU15 countries into neighbors
of the new member states and non-neighbors of the new member states. Neighbors
are defined as countries with a common land or water border with one or more new
EU-members, for example Austria and Italy are neighbors of Slovenia. The average
nominal tax rate of the new member states and Ireland are presented separately.
Figure 3 not only illustrates that the older EU15 countries have a higher tax rate
than the new member states, but also that neighbors compared to non-neighbors of
the new member states have known a much larger absolute decrease in their average
corporate tax rate (12% versus 6%). While the average tax rate in the non-neighbors
remained stable for a long period, the average tax rate in the neighbors decreased
rapidly and dived under the average tax rate of the non-neighbors in 2000. These
reforms could indicate that neighbors of the new member states are subject of more
intense tax competition as a result of their geographical proximity to the Eastern
low tax areas.
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Figure 3: Neighbors versus non-neighbors of the new member states, 1993-2006
Neighbors: Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy and Greece; Non-neighbors:
Spain, France, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal
The STR is not weighted. Source: Vandenbussche & Crabbe´ (2006), extra data included for 2005
and 2006.
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To gain more insight in the declining corporate tax rates of the neighbors and non-
neighbors of the new member states, Figure 4 illustrates the corporate tax rates
for the individual countries. This figure indicates that neighbors of the NMS not
only have the largest decrease in corporate tax rates, but also started decreasing
much faster. Almost all neighboring countries started their decrease in corporate
taxes around 1992-1993, while the decrease in taxes of the non-neighbors started
only around 1996-1997. Moreover, we observe that this decrease in corporate tax
rates is independent of the size of the country. For example the tax rate of Germany
decreased by 18.2% during the period, while the tax rate of a large non-neighbor
country like France only decreased by 3.7%.
3 Related Literature on Fiscal Reaction Functions
Mukand & Rodrik (2005) point out that countries mimic policies of their neighbors
even when this is not the best solution for their economic situation. This mim-
icking behavior can also be found in (corporate) tax competition. Theoretical and
empirical work point out that countries or regions do not set their tax rate indepen-
dently, but take into account the tax rates in related countries or regions. Countries
or regions do this according to two reasons: yardstick competition and capital tax
competition. The first theory poses that voters judge policy-makers on their per-
formance by comparing tax rates of neighboring countries. Therefore, politicians,
to ascertain their re-election, will ‘tax mimic’ their neighbors’ tax rate. The second
theory argues that countries compete to attract capital by setting lower tax rates.
It is not always clear whether the presence of ‘tax mimicking’ comes from yard-
stick or tax competition, since the empirical method for both theories is the same
(Brueckner 2003). With regard to corporate taxes, Devereux et al. (2003) argue
that yardstick competition can be eliminated as a possible explanation. The reason
is that corporate taxes are not a critical topic for voters to evaluate policy-makers,
certainly because most voters do not even know the domestic corporate tax rate.
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Figure 4: Evolution statutory tax rates in Europe
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On the other hand, Bordignon (2007) comes to the conclusion that yardstick and
fiscal competition usually work one against the other. In this paper, we can not dis-
tinguish between both forms of competition. Our goal is to study intergovernmental
competition in corporate taxes in order to attract foreign investment.
Empirical studies estimate a fiscal reaction function of a certain jurisdiction which
relates the tax rate of this jurisdiction to its own characteristics and to the tax
rate in competing jurisdictions. When tax rates are chosen strategically, the reac-
tion function has a nonzero slope indicating that competitors’ tax rates influence
the given jurisdiction’s choice. The sign of the slope can be positive or negative
depending on the specific parameter values. If strategic interaction is absent, the
slope of the reaction function is not significantly different from zero (Brueckner &
Saavedra 2001). This methodology has been used in many articles on local property,
business or personal taxes (Besley & Case (1995), Bordignon et al. (2002), Heyndels
& Vuchelen (1998), Brueckner (1998), Brett & Pinkse (2000), Brueckner & Saavedra
(2001), Carlsen et al. (2005), Buettner (2001), Ladd (1992), Allers & Elhorst (2005),
Hayashi & Boadway (2001), Allers & Elhorst (2005), etc) and government expen-
diture levels (Olle´ (2003), Figlio et al. (1999), Revelli (2003), Case et al. (1993),
Geys (2006), Baicker (2005), Werck et al. (2007), etc) across jurisdictions within
one country3.
Devereux et al. (2003) analyze strategic tax competition in 21 OECD countries
in the period 1982-1999. They find that countries strategically compete over the
statutory tax rate and EATR4 and that countries with relatively high effective tax
rates react more strongly to tax rates in other countries. A second study examining
strategic tax competition between countries and the first using only EU countries is
Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002). They find that EU countries strategically compete
with geographically close countries using corporate tax revenues over GDP, but not
3See Brueckner (2003) for an overview of empirical studies on strategic interaction
4EATR= effective average tax rate calculated using the forward looking method, see Devereux
et al. (2002).
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using personal income tax revenues. They also conclude that since the US tax reform
of 1986, European countries compete to a lesser extent with the US in corporate tax
rates. A second study using exclusively European countries is Redoano (2003). She
shows that tax competition mainly occurs between geographically close countries
using statutory tax rates for 13 European countries during the period 1980-1995.
Finally, Ruiz & Gerard (2007) find empirical evidence of limited ‘tax mimicking’
between neighboring EU15 countries using statutory and effective tax rates during
the period 1989-2001. They argue that possible converging tax rates in the EU15
can explain their weaker result of spatial tax competition.
This paper will extend the limited number of studies using fiscal reaction functions
on exclusively European Union countries. In particular, the impact of changes in the
tax rates of the new member states (EU10) on the tax rates of the EU14 will be the
focus. Furthermore, different definitions of neighbors will be used to gain insights
in the spatial tax competition process in the EU25 during the period 1993-2006.
4 Theory
A first step in illustrating which role distance to a peripheral region or country has
in tax competition is to set up a theoretical framework. In our model two countries
A and B are located on a fixed distance x from each other as illustrated in Figure
5.
Country A and B compete for the location of a single firm, a multinational that does
not compete with the domestic firms5 and has its home base outside the countries
considered in the model. This multinational will set up in only one of the countries
and sell to the other country by exporting. The locations are symmetric in the
sense that set up costs and marginal production costs are assumed to be the same,
5The assumption that the MNE is a monopoly with a competitive fringe and so does not com-
pete with domestic firms is needed to keep the model tractable analytically, without changing the
qualitative implications of the model.
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Figure 5: Spatial tax competition: a theoretical framework
therefore in comparing location A and B they will not affect the location decision
of the multinational and can be dropped from the analysis. To export to the other
country, the multinational will have to pay a transportation cost c which is related
to the distance x between the countries.
A final assumption is that country A is a more developed country in terms of in-
frastructure, technology, etc. While country B is less attractive for production, we
call it a peripheral country. This assumption is translated in a larger market size
for country A than for country B (M >> m). The order of events in the model is
as follows.
• Stage 1: Government A and B will set their profit tax rate simultaneously6.
• Stage 2: the multinational makes its location decision.
• Stage 3: the multinational sells and exports an equilibrium output that max-
imizes its profits.
6We acknowledge that there might be a time inconsistency problem, but we assume here that
both countries commit to the tax rate they have set in stage 1 (Haufler & Wooton 2003).
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We solve the model backwards, introducing additional formal notation as required7.
In stage 3, the multinational (MNE) sells and exports a certain output to maximize
its profits. Using the inverse demand functions of both countries A and B
PA = (M −QA) (1)
PB = (m−QB),
where PA and PB are the prices and QA and QB the domestic outputs, the after-tax
profit of the multinational is:
piA = ((M −QA)QA + (m−QAB)QAB − cxQAB)(1− tA) (2)
piB = [(m−QB)QB + (M −QBA)QBA − cxQBA](1− tB)
where QAB and QBA are the exported outputs, tA (tB) is the corporate tax rate of
country A (B) and 0< tA(tB) <1.
Maximizing these after-tax profits leads us to the equilibrium outputs in A and B
respectively:
A : Q∗A =
M
2
and Q∗AB =
m− cx
2
(3)
B : Q∗B =
m
2
and Q∗BA =
M − cx
2
In order for the outputs to be positive, the following conditions must be true:
M > cx and m > cx. Using these equilibrium outputs in equation (2) gives the
equilibrium after-tax profits in A and B respectively:
pi∗A =
M2 + (m− cx)2
4
(1− tA) (4)
pi∗B =
m2 + (M − cx)2
4
(1− tB)
The second stage of the model deals with the MNE’s location decision. The multi-
national will be indifferent in its location preference when its after-tax profit in
7The detailed computations are described in the Appendix.
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country A equals the after-tax profit it could earn in country B. This is when the
tax rate of country A equals
pi∗A = pi
∗
B (5)
⇒ tIndiffA = −(1− tB)(
m2 + (M − cx)2
M2 + (m− cx)2 ) + 1
=
2cx(M −m) + tB(m2 + (M − cx)2)
M2 + (m− cx)2
For this tax rate, the multinational is indifferent between country A and B. The
’indifference’ tax rate is among others a function of the tax rate of the other country,
market size of both countries, transport cost and distance x.
As a consequence, country A has two options in the first stage where both countries
set their tax rates simultaneously. Country A can set its tax rate below or above
tIndiffA and both options will result in a different welfare function. We assume that
the welfare function consists of consumer surplus (CS), and tax revenue from taxing
the firm’s profit. As in Haufler & Wooton (2003) the home base of our multinational
is outside country A and B so that after-tax profits will be shifted abroad and do
not enter the welfare function8 The welfare function (W ) in general can thus be
written as follows
Wi = CSi + ti
pi∗i
1− ti (6)
If country A chooses option 1 and sets a tax rate lower than tIndiffA , then the
multinational will find country A more attractive and will locate in A. Country A
will receive tax incomes from taxing the firm’s profit. On the other hand, if country
A chooses to set its tax rate above t∗A (option 2), then the firm will find country B
a better location. As a consequence, country A looses its tax income and consumer
surplus in this option will be lower than in the first option due to transport costs
(see Appendix for a proof).
8Including the firm’s after-tax profits into the welfare function would not change our basic result,
on the contrary it would strengthen the outcome. But it makes the algebra simpler.
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This argument can be summarized as follows
tA < t
∗
A ⇒ WA1 = CS1 + tA
piA∗
1− tA (7)
OR
tA > t
∗
A ⇒ WA2 = CS2
Since welfare under option 1 is higher than under option 2, country A will set its
tax rate below tIndiffA . The same result is achieved when we maximize the welfare
in option 1. Maximizing this welfare shows that the optimal tax rate should be as
large as possible.
δWA
δtA
=
M2 + (M − cx)2
4
(8)
This indicates that the optimal tax rate for country A should be as close as possible
to tIndiffA or in other words, country A will set its tax rate a fraction ξ below the
tax rate where the firm is indifferent between locations, tIndiffA :
t∗A =
2cx(M −m) + tB(m2 + (M − cx)2)
M2 + (m− cx)2 − ξ. (9)
The same story holds for country B such that
t∗B =
2cx(m−M) + tA(M2 + (m− cx)2)
m2 + (M − cx)2 − ξ (10)
From the above equation (9), we see that the tax rate of country A will always
be positive if M > m, which is an assumption of the model. The tax rate for
country B can be negative even under this assumption of M > m, which implies
that country B would be willing to subsidize the multinational to make it locate
in its country. Moreover, there is a positive relation between the market size and
the tax rate, indicating that larger countries can set higher tax rates (see proof
in appendix). Furthermore, equations (9) and (10) show that both tax rates are
strategic complements ( δt
∗
A
δt∗B
> 0): a higher tax in country B will lead country A
to set a higher tax rate as well. This indicates that if country B increases its tax
rate, country A can also set a higher tax rate without inducing the firm to move to
country B. But it also works the other way around, if country B decreases its tax
rate, country A must set a lower tax rate in order not to lose the multinational.
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This brings us to the main question in this paper, namely what happens if country
A would be located closer or further away from the peripheral country B. In other
words what would happen to the tax rate of A if distance x between the countries
was smaller?
∂tA
∂x
= 2c(1− tB)(M2 +m2 − c2x2)(M −m) > 0 (11)
Equation (11) implies that the tax rate of country A is a positive function in dis-
tance. This indicates that countries closer to the peripheral country B will set lower
taxes, which is a very intuitive result. Take for example Germany, adjacent to a
new member state Poland, and the UK, not neighboring a new member state. A
multinational willing to invest in Germany will reconsider this strategy and rather
set up in Poland due to among others lower labor costs and taxes. Since Germany
is a neighbor, transport costs will be low. But if the multinational initially wants to
invest in the UK, setting up a production center in Poland will be less obvious. The
outcome of the theoretical model can be summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION: EU14 countries closer to the new member states experience
more tax competition.
5 Methodology and Data
To test this theoretical proposition empirically, a fiscal reaction function for the
EU14 countries is estimated. As explained in section 3, a fiscal reaction function
has a nonzero slope when countries strategically react to tax rates in other countries.
We investigate the reaction of the EU14 on the new member states (NMS) for the
period 1993-2006.
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TAXiEU14,t = β1TAXiEU14,t−1 + β2(
∑
i6=j
wijTAXjNMS ,t) (12)
+β3Xi,t + αi + εit
In the above expression (12), the dependent variable TAX is the statutory tax
rate of country i in the EU149 at time t10. On the right hand side, the model
includes the lagged dependent TAX variable, the weighted tax rate of the 10 new
member states11 (wijTAXjNMS , t), a set of country control variables (X)12 such
as population density, GDP per capita and the lagged personal income tax rate13,
country fixed effects (αi) and time dummies (δt).
The weighted tax rates of the new member states is our main variable of interest.
This variable is the weighted sum of the statutory corporate tax rates of the new
EU10 member states:
(wTAX)it =
∑
j 6=i
wijTAXjt
∀i :
∑
j
wij = 1
(13)
For the weight, different measures from the theory will be used. According to Besley
& Case (1995), spatial models typically use geographical weights for 2 reasons. First,
geographic neighbors are likely to experience similar shocks and therefore neighbors’
tax rates are more informative than tax rates in far away districts. A second reason
9EU14= Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, UK, Denmark,
Sweden, Finland, Austria, Italy and Greece
10All data on corporate tax rates are collected from KPMG (2006)’s tax surveys and were available
for 1993-2006.
11Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Malta and
Cyprus
12The control variables, population density and GDP per capita are collected from the world de-
velopment indicators (WDI), while the personal income tax rate is available in the OECD database
until 2004
13personal income tax rate is lagged by one period since this variable is possible endogenous
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is that information about policy decisions in nearby countries spreads quicker. The
main weighing scheme that we will use is the inverse distance between the capital
cities of countries of the EU14 and the new member states. The data on distance is
collected from the CEPII database. Distance is measured as the distance between
capital cities following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes
of the cities and incorporates the internal distance of the country based on areas
(Head & Mayer 2002)14.
In addition, six other weighing schemes will be used to gain insight in the EU14
tax competition game. The most widely used definition of neighbors is contiguity.
In this definition the weight wij equals 1 if country i has a common land or water
border with country j and 0 otherwise. A third spatial weight is based on the idea
that also neighbors of second order can be affected by changes in the corporate tax
rates of the EU10 countries. In this case, wij equals 1 if country i is has a common
border with an adjacent neighbor of country j and 0 otherwise. The fifth weight is
the share of trade (export + import) with country j in GDP of country i15. Finally,
the sixth weighing scheme is based on the inverse distance between GDP per capita
and is constructed as follows16:
1/(GDPi,t −GDPj,t)∑
j 1/(GDPi,t −GDPj,t)
(14)
Note that these last two weights, trade share and GDP per capita are allowed to be
time variant17. All weights are normalized so that their sum equals 1.
By estimating this model (12) several econometric issues pop up. First, including
a lagged dependent variable in a fixed effects model will lead to correlation since
14Other studies use more sophisticated measures of distance (Davis & Weinstein 2003). But
for our research question, distance between capital cities is a good indicator of distance between
countries.
15Trade data is collected from IMF database and GDP data is collected from Eurostat
16Data on GDP per capita is collected from Eurostat.
17Except for Redoano (2003) previous studies used weights based on the average of a variable
over time.
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fixed effects are time invariant (Woolridge 2003). A possible solution is to estimate
equation (12) in first differences in order to get rid of this correlation. Taking first
differences will lead to correlation between the lagged dependent variable in dif-
ferences and the error term in differences, thus the lagged dependent variable in
differences should be instrumented with lags of 2 or more periods. Second, our vari-
able of interest, the weighted tax rate of the NMS, could be endogenous: tax rates
of the EU14 will influence the tax rates of the new member states as well. To solve
this problem, the instrumental variables method (2SLS) is frequently applied in the
fiscal reaction literature (Brueckner (2003), Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002), Redoano
(2003), Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Brett & Pinkse (2000), Carlsen et al. (2005),
Olle´ (2003), Figlio et al. (1999), Revelli (2002), Ladd (1992), Buettner (2003), Geys
(2006), Baicker (2005), Werck et al. (2007) and Allers & Elhorst (2005)). Table 1
gradually introduces the final estimation procedure of the reaction function (12).
The first column in Table 1 estimates equation (12) using OLS and country fixed
effects. The second column uses an autoregressive fixed effects model to include
the autocorrelation of the EU14 tax rates. As explained above, an OLS estimation
procedure is not correct since the weighted tax rates of the NMS are endogenous.
Therefore, column (3) estimates a fixed effects model and instruments the endoge-
nous variable, WTaxNMS,t. As a consequence the new estimation procedure will
be:
First stage :
∑
i6=j
wijTAXjNMS ,t = α1
∑
i6=j
wijXjNMS + α2XiEU14 + ρjt (15)
Second stage : TAXiEU14,t = β2
ˆ
(
∑
i6=j
wijTAXjNMS ,t)
+β3XiEU14,t + αiEU14 + εit
Finally, column (4) will include a lagged dependent variable. Taking into account
that this is correlated with the fixed effects, we will take first differences and instru-
ment the lagged dependent variable in differences with lags of 2 or more periods. In
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symbols, our final estimation procedure is:
First stage : ∆
∑
i6=j
wijTAXjNMS ,t = α1∆
∑
i6=j
wijXjNMS ,t (16)
+α2∆XiEU14,t +∆ρjt
Second stage : ∆TAXiEU14,t = β1∆TAXiEU14,t−1 + β2∆XiEU14,t (17)
+β3∆
ˆ
(
∑
i6=j
wijTAXjNMS ,t) + ∆εit
The result shows that a decrease by 10% in the tax rates of the new member states
(EU10), will induce a reduction of 18% in the tax rates of the EU14 countries that
are on a close distance to the new member states. The p-value of the sargan test is
larger than 0.1 and thus implies that our instruments are valid.
6 Results
This section reports the results of different specifications of (16) in comparison with
the benchmark regression in Table 1, column (4).
Column (1) in Table 2 includes Ireland in the aggregated distance weighted tax
rates, WTaxNMS,t. The coefficient is still positive significant, but is much lower
than before. A possible reason for this weaker result is that only UK is a close
neighbor of Ireland. To gain more insight in the reaction function of the EU14,
columns (2) and (3) split up the sample in direct neighbors (Italy, Germany, Austria,
Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Greece) and non-neighbors (Belgium, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, France, UK, Portugal and Spain) of the new member states (NMS).
The estimations indicate that only the neighbors react to the tax rate of the new
member states and that these neighbors do not react to tax rates of the NMS’
non-neighbors.
Since Finland, Austria and Sweden only joined the European Union in 1995, col-
umn (5) estimates equation (16) for the period 1995-2006. Also for this shorter
19
Table 1: Model construction
dep var.=taxEU14 (1) (2) (3) (4)
xtreg xtregar xtivreg, fe IV, lag, fe
Taxi,t−1 -0.09
(0.13)
WTaxNMS,t 0.79*** 0.16 0.97*** 1.83***
(0.1) (0.14) (0.17) (0.86)
Income taxi,t−1 -0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.41
(0.14) (0.21) (0.14) (0.31)
GDP per capitai,t 0.001*** -0.0004 0.001*** 0.002**
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.001)
Population densityi,t 0.11 -0.27 0.15 0.38
(0.09) (0.24) (0.1) (0.35)
Constant -20.65 82.66*** -39.92* 0.68
(16.59) (8.37) (22.53) (0.82)
Obs 169 156 169 156
R squared 0.43 0.04 0.42
Sargan test (pvalues) 0.8
Standard errors are in parentheses. The instruments used for WTaxNMS,t: the proportion of
the population younger than 14 years, population density and the number of active residents.
note:***,** and * denote significance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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period, the positive reaction is still significant. In general, tax competition mod-
els predict that tax rates are jointly determined and hence indicate endogeneity of
WTaxNMS,t. But it seems very plausible that the government in each country sets
its tax as a best response to taxes of the new member states in the previous period
. Therefore, column (5) includes a lagged term of WTaxNMS,t. We observe that
the simultaneous reaction is not significant anymore, while the lagged reaction is
positive and significant. Although a Wald test can not reject that coefficients of
both variables are equal, this would suggest that EU14 countries react to taxes of
the new member states in the previous period. Finally, column (6) uses a different
set of instrumental variables for WTaxNMS,t, namely institutional variables such as
measures of enterprise reforms, trade liberalization and competition policy18. The
result shows that EU14 countries react positive and significantly to taxes in the new
member states and the Sargan test confirms the validity of the instruments.
7 Robustness checks
Table 4 reports some robustness checks of the previous results. Instead of estimating
the reaction of the EU14 to the aggregate taxes of the NMS, column (1) splits up
the NMS in smaller groups of countries: the Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania and
Latvia), Ireland and the 5 largest NMS (Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland
and Hungary). Cyprus and Malta are left out since these countries are very small
and have almost no neighbors. Only the coefficient of the group of the 5 largest
NMS (Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) is positive and
significant, implying that the EU14 reacts mainly to these 5 new member states.
Secondly, column (2) to (5) test other weights of the NMS’ taxes. First column (2)
uses a dummy equal to 1 if country i is an adjacent neighbor of a NMS, while in
column (2) the weight is a dummy equal to 1 if country i has a common border with
an adjacent neighbor of a NMS. None of these weighted tax rates are significant.
18These institutional variables are collected from the EBRD reports
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Table 2: Estimation results
dep var.=taxEU14 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ireland Neighb. Non-neighb. ’95-’06 lag instit.
Taxi,t−1 -0.04 -0.14 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 -0.12
(0.09) (0.22) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
WTaxNMS,t 1.99* 0.17 1.8** 0.3 1.62*
(1.22) (0.34) (0.86) (0.34) (0.94)
WTaxNMS+Ireland,t 0.01*
(0.01)
WTaxnon−neighbors,t -1.2
(1.03)
WTaxneighbors,t 1.44
(1.7)
WTaxNMS,t−1 1.08*
(0.61)
Income taxi,t−1 -0.15 -0.23 0.09 -0.41 -0.36 -0.35
(0.2) (0.49) (0.23) (0.82) (0.33) (0.31)
GDP per capitai,t 0.001 0.003 0.0003 0.002* 0.002** 0.001*
(0.001) (002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population densityi,t 0.37 3.57 -0.02 0.38 0.34 0.32
(0.29) (3.23) (0.19) (0.35) (0.37) (0.34)
Constant -0.18 -1.35 -0.08 0.68 -1.5** 0.57
(0.5) (1.54) (0.61) (0.82) (0.66) (0.99)
Obs 156 56 72 156 156 143
Sargan test (pvalues) 0.06 0.8 0.19 0.8 0.6 0.31
Standard errors are in parentheses. The instruments used for WTaxNMS,t: the proportion of the
population younger than 14 years, population density and the number of active residents. In column
(6) the instruments for WTaxNMS,t are an indicator of enterprise reforms, trade liberalization and
competition policy. note:***,** and * denote significance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and
10 percent levels.
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Possibly these types of weights are too roughly defined. Moreover, we could not find
valid instruments for this variable as the Sargan p-values point out. In column (3)
the weight is the share of trade with country j in GDP of country i. The argument
is that EU14 countries might react more to taxes of their trading partners. The
coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that EU14 countries react to taxes
of the NMS in particular if these NMS are their trading partners. But the coefficient
is very small. In column (5) we test whether EU14 countries compete over taxes
having countries with similar economic characteristics. The result is positive, but
not significant, which could imply that a geographical neighbor is more important
than economic similarity in the fiscal reaction of EU14 countries to NMS19.
Finally, the last column uses the effective tax rate of the NMS instead of the official
tax rate. This reaction function is not significant which would imply that EU14
countries do not take into account the effective tax rates of NMS in setting their own
effective tax rate. These results are in contrast to Devereux et al. (2003) who find no
significant competition in STRs for OECD countries but they do find competition
in effective tax rates. A possible reason for this difference is that they use a different
method to calculate effective tax rates 20. Moreover, we have observed (see Figure
2) that effective tax rates in Europe are quite stable. Tax reforms in Europe are
characterized with decreasing tax rates, but an increasing taxable basis and thus
stable effective tax rates. Therefore, we did not expect any result from effective tax
rates.
19 Redoano (2003) also did not find significant tax competition between economically similar
(GDP per capita) EU13 countries
20They calculate the ETR by the method of Devereux et al. (2002). For a complete overview of
ETR calculations see Nicode`me (2001).
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Table 3: Robustness Checks
dep var.=taxEU14 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FON SON trade GDP etr
Taxi,t−1 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.13 -0.09 -0.03
(0.1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.21) (0.08)
WTaxSI,SV,CZ,PO,HU,t 0.01** 0.04 0.05
(0.005) (0.05) (0.03)
WTaxbaltic,t 0.01 0.07 -0.06
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06)
WTaxIreland,t 49.05 0.01 0.03
(92.73) (0.03) (0.11)
Wexportij,tTaxNMS,t 0.04**
(0.02)
W 1/(GDPi,t−GDPj,t)P
j 1/(GDPi,t−GDPj,t)
TaxNMS,t 4.23
(3.75)
WdistanceETRNMS,t 0.08
(0.07)
Income taxi,t−1 -0.02 -0.18 0.01 -0.09 -1.13 -0.03
(0.2) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (1.11) (0.16)
GDP per capitai,t 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Population densityi,t 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.96 0.08
(0.23) (0.21) (0.24) (0.28) (0.9) (0.2)
Constant -0.56 -0.95*** -0.89*** -0.4 2.86 -0.81***
(0.36) (0.27) (0.29) (0.52) (3.13) (0.26)
Obs 156 156 156 104 143 156
Sargan test (pvalues) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.13 0.29 0.02
Standard errors are in parentheses. Column (1) splits WTaxNMS,t up into smaller groups of
countries and instruments with lags. Column (2) weights the taxes of NMS by a dummy equal
to 1 if country i is an adjacent neighbor of a NMS, while column (3) uses a dummy equal to 1
if country i is a second order neighbor of a NMS. The weight in column (3) is the share of trade
(export+import) from country i to the NMS in GDP of i. In column (4) the taxes of NMS are
weighted with the distance in GDP per capita between both countries. Finally, column (5) uses
the distance weighted effective tax rates (etr) of the NMS. All weighted variables, WTaxNMS,t are
instrumented with their lag. note:***,** and * denote significance level of estimates at respectively
1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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8 Conclusion
During the past decade corporate tax rates decreased greatly in the ’old EU14. Es-
pecially, Germany and Italy experienced the largest decrease in their tax rates. Not
surprisingly, both countries are neighbors of the ‘new’ EU10. This paper analyzes
strategic tax setting in the ’old’ EU14 as a reaction to the tax rates in the new
member states. To our knowledge, this is the first paper studying the impact of the
new EU member states on tax rates of the old Europe.
First, a spatial competition model is developed to predict the role of distance in tax
competition. In this model a multinational makes its location decision between two
countries taking into account the corporate tax rates, market size and transport
cost. The outcome of the model suggests that tax competition is more intense
between geographically close countries. Second, this result is empirically verified for
the EU14 during the period 1993-2006 using a fiscal reaction function. Estimations
show that only neighbors of the new member states seem to react to low taxes
of these new members. Moreover, we observe that neighbors of the new member
states react far less to changes in the tax rate of other EU14 countries. To put it
differently, the corporate tax rate of a country like Germany or Denmark seems to
respond to changes in the tax rate of the new member states like Czech Republic,
but will respond much less to the tax rate of for example Belgium. When using other
definitions of neighbors we only find weak spatial tax competition among trading
partners.
The resulting spatial dimension of tax competition in this paper will also have
implications for transfer pricing. Since we find that neighbors of Eastern Europe
are subject to more intense tax competition, tax differences between these countries
will become smaller. As a consequence smaller tax differences are likely to induce
less profit shifting towards Eastern Europe. In addition, smaller tax differentials will
also stimulate decentralization choices of multinationals as pointed out by Nielsen
et al. (2007).
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9 Appendix A
Figure 6: Map of EU25
New member states (EU10= black)= Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia
Neighbors of NMS (dark grey)= Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Italy and Greece
non-neighbors (light grey)= Netherlands, Belgium, France, UK, Spain and Portugal
Ireland (grey)
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The computations of the model in section 4 in more detail:
The inverse demand functions are derived from:
Q = M − bP where for simplicity is assumed that b=1. ⇒ PA = M − QA and
PB =M −QB.
Using these inverse demand functions, the after-tax profits in country A and B are
respectively
piA = (M −QA)QA(1− tA) (18)
piB = [(m−QB)QB + (M −QAB)QAB − cx2QAB](1− tB)
Maximizing the after-tax profits leads to the equilibrium output. The maximization
is as follows
For A:
∂piA
∂QA
= (1− tA)(M −QA −QA) = 0 (19)
⇒ Q∗A =
M
2
and
δpiA
δQAB
= (1− tA)((m−QAB)−QAB − cx) = 0
⇒ Q∗AB =
m− cx
2
For B:
∂piB
∂QB
= (1− tB)(m−QB −QB) = 0 (20)
⇒ Q∗B =
m
2
and
∂piB
∂QBA
= (1− tB)(m−QBA −QBA − cx) = 0
⇒ QBA = M − cx2
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Proof: CS1 > CS2
CS1 =
∫ Q∗A
0
(PAdQA)− PAQ∗A =
Q2A
2
(21)
CS2 =
∫ Q∗A
0
(PAdQA)− PAQ∗A − cxQA =
Q2A − 2cxQA
2
⇒ Q
2
A
2
>
Q2A − 2cxQA
2
Proof: δt
∗
A
δM > 0
δt∗A
δM
=
[2cx+ tB2(M − cx)][M2 + (m− cx)2]− 2M(2cx(M −m))
[M2 + (m− cx)2]2 (22)
−2M(tB(m2 + (M − cx)2)
[M2 + (m− cx)2]2
=
2(1− tB)cx[(m− cx)2 +M(2m−M)]
[M2 + (m− cx)2]2 > 0
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Table 4: First stage regression results of benchmark regression in Table 1, column
(4).
∆TaxiEU14,t−1 ∆WijTaxNMS,t
∆popdensityi,t .2 -0.17
(0.2) (0.13)
∆gdp per capitai,t 0.0004 -0.001***
(0.001) (0.003)
∆income taxi,t−1 0.4*** 0.27***
(0.16) (0.1)
Taxi,t−2 -0.09*** -0.04***
(0.03) (0.02)
∆Wijpopulation > 14yj,t -0.37 -0.83*
(0.81) (0.51)
∆Wijpopulation densityj,t 0.35 -0.07
(0.33) (0.21)
∆Wijactive populationj,t -6.81E-09 -5.33E-08
(7.5E-08) (4.69E-08)
constant 2.34*** 0.38
(0.91) (0.57)
Obs 156 156
Standard errors are in parentheses. note:***,** and * denote significance level of estimates at
respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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